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Introduction
American media dominate the flow of global information. Since
World War II, the central role assumed by U.S. news media has be-
come the rule, not the exception, in world communication systems.'
British media scholar Jeremy Tunstall has observed: "In most of the
world's countries the media are only there at all, on the present scale,
as the result of imports in which the American media
predominate."'2
The ever-expanding transnational operations of the American
media3 have resulted in a growing number of libel4 suits filed against
the media in foreign courts.' Libel remains an "occupational hazard"
for the news media.6 Indeed, C. Thomas Dienes, general counsel for
U.S. News & World Report, stated: "I make difficult decisions such as
assessing the risk that the Ayatollah Khomeini might sue the maga-
zine for libel."7
Under libel law, "[c]ases may arise where a publication in the
United States is alleged to be defamatory of a national or resident of
some other country."8 In other cases, "a U.S. defendant may have
distributed or broadcast an allegedly defamatory publication outside
the U.S."9 For example, in June 1992, three Korean women sued
Newsweek magazine in a Seoul court for an allegedly defamatory
1. See generally WILLIAM H. READ, AMERICA'S MASS MEDIA MERCHANTS 18 (1976).
2. JEREMY TUNSTALL, THE MEDIA ARE AMERICAN 17 (1977).
3. For a succinct discussion of the transnational operation of American media organi-
zations, see WILLIAM A. HACHTEN, THE WORLD NEWS PRISM 94-109 (3d ed. 1992). For
detailed statistics on American media in foreign countries, see ACHAL MEHRA, FREE
FLOW OF INFORMATION 57, 58, 60, 65, 68, 69, 73, 76 (1986).
4. Media attorney Bruce Sanford, author of the highly acclaimed Libel and Privacy,
defines libel as "a false statement of fact printed or broadcast about a person which tends
to injure that person's reputation." BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 97 (2d ed.
1993).
5. For an extensive account of libel suits against American media filed in British
courts, see Robin Pogrebin, Libel Gripes Go Offshore; London a Town Named Sue, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Sept. 23, 1991, at 1 [hereinafter Pogrebin, Libel Gripes].
6. PAUL P. ASHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY 6 (5th ed. rev. 1976). Libel suits are not the only
legal threats facing American media abroad. There is the possibility that foreign news
sources may sue members of the American media for negligence in disclosing the sources'
identities. See Lubo Li, 'Opening the Pandora's Box': Were American Media Guilty of
Negligence in Disclosing Tiananmen Protestors' Identities? 20-23 (Aug. 1992) (research
paper presented at the annual convention of the Association for Education in Journalism
and Mass Communication in Montreal, Can.) (on file with author).
7. C. Thomas Dienes, Libel Reform: An Appraisal, 23 J.L. REFORM 1 (1989).
8. Michael J. Calvey et al., Foreign Defamation Law, in LIBEL DEFENSE RESOURCE
CENTER 50-STATE SURVEY 1987, at xiv (Henry R. Kaufman ed., 1987).
9. Id.
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photo1" published in Newsweek International's Pacific edition.1' They
claimed that "[slince the photo was printed in Newsweek . . . , [they
had] been scorned by acquaintances and suffered unbearable mental
agony."' 2 In June 1989, the Wall Street Journal reported that at least
four libel suits against American media were being litigated in British
courts.13 More recently, Deborah R. Linfield, a New York Times at-
torney, noted that six American publishers and broadcasters have
been either sued or threatened with suits for libel in foreign countries
including England, Canada, India and Trinidad."
There is a "small but disturbing and growing trend" among libel
plaintiffs to sue American media abroad. 15 This trend is particularly
well illustrated by a 1992 case, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications,
10. Three Ex-Ewha University Students Sue Newsweek for Compensation, KOREA
HERALD, June 13, 1992, at 3 [hereinafter Students Sue Newsweek]. The picture of several
Ewha Women's University students, whose caption read "'Slaves to money': Students at
Ewha Women's University," appeared in Newsweek International's Pacific edition in No-
vember 1991. It was part of Newsweek's cover story on a Korean spending spree. See Tony
Emerson, Too Rich, Too Soon, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Nov. 11, 1991, at 16 (Pacific ed.). As of
March 4, 1993, the libel suit against Newsweek in Korea was in the pretrial discovery pro-
cess. Telephone Interview with Tina Ravitz, General Counsel, Newsweek, Inc. (Mar. 4,
1993).
11. In 1991, Newsweek International had a paid circulation of 217,661 for its Pacific
edition. HACHTEN, supra note 3, at 99.
12. Students Sue Newsweek, supra note 10. Indeed, Ewha Women's University in Se-
oul had threatened to sue Newsweek in a Korean court for the photo caption unless the
magazine responded "sincerely" to the university's demand for correction of the caption.
Id. President Yoon Hoo-Jung of Ewha Women's University requested that Newsweek clar-
ify the caption and apologize for the injury it caused to the institutional reputation of the
school. Id. Ewha Women's University, a prestigious private institution with a student en-
rollment of 15,000, is reported to be "the largest university for women in the world." A
Comfortable Ethos Gives Way to a Brave New World, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 24,
1993, at C10. Newsweek responded to Yoon's demand by publishing an editor's note of
"regret" for "any misunderstanding the caption may have caused" to Ewha Women's Uni-
versity. Rich Korea. NEWSWEEK INT'L, Dec. 2, 1991, at 5 (Pacific ed.). It also stated: "We
did not intend to impugn the reputation of the school." Id. The editor's note in Newsweek
International followed the letter from Sung-Hwan Lee, Dean of University Planning and
Development at Ewha. Id.
13. Amy Dockser, Plaintiffs Take Libel Suits Abroad, to Favorable Laws, WALL ST. J.,
June 6, 1989, at B1. Among the four libel suits pending in British courts were two cases
against Dow Jones & Co., the publisher of the Wall Street Journal. Id.
14. Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of India Abroad Publications, Inc. at 3-4, Bach-
chan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992) [hereinafter Amicus Cu-
riae Brief].
15. George Garneau, Importing British Libel Law, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 25,
1992, at 7 (quoting New York Times attorney Deborah R. Linfield). See also Ellen Joan
Pollock & George Anders, Libel Judgment From Britain Is Rejected, WALL ST. J., Apr. 16,
1992, at B6 ("'There is a troubling trend toward suing U.S. publishers in more libel-friendly
jurisdictions."') (quoting attorney Laura R. Handman). Laura Handman was a defense
attorney in Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661. For a discussion of Bachchan, see infra notes 16-
21, 69-116 and accompanying text.
1994]
Inc. 6 The plaintiff, an Indian national in London, asked a New York
State trial court to enforce in New York the libel verdict that he won
in England against a media defendant, which publishes a weekly paper
and operates a news service for Asian Indians in the United States.
17
While noting that the United States and England share many princi-
ples of the common law, Judge Shirley Fingerhood of the New York
Supreme Court (New York County) stated that England's lack of an
equivalent to the First Amendment was a "significant difference."' 8
She ruled that enforcing a foreign libel judgment would seriously
jeopardize the First Amendment protections of speech and the
press.19
New York Times syndicated columnist Anthony Lewis argued,
prior to the Bachchan decision, that the case might make British libel
law a real threat to American media.2" Had the plaintiff prevailed,
Bachchan would have established that "U.S. publishers or broadcast-
ers whose work is distributed in other countries could be sued under
local libel laws, no matter how restrictive. Then, with court judgments
in hand, plaintiffs could demand [a] U.S. court to order CBS or the
New York Times to pay up."'"
Based upon the premise that the growing number of libel suits
being brought against American media in foreign courts, particularly
in English courts,22 carries significant implications for the American
press, this Article examines four questions in light of Bachchan. First,
what are the similarities and differences, if any, between American
and English libel laws? Second, how have libel cases been adjudicated
against American media in foreign courts? Third, what have been the
legal rationale and policies underlying libel suits against American
media in foreign countries? Finally, what implications do extraterrito-
rial libel suits hold for the American press?




20. Anthony Lewis, British Libel Law Shield Against Critics, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Dec.
11, 1991, at A23 [hereinafter Lewis, British Libel Law].
21. Garneau, supra note 15.
22. One American journalist wrote: "American lawyers increasingly are advising their
clients to bypass U.S. courts and take their cases across the ocean. As a result, Britain is
becoming something of a treasure island for those who feel wronged by U.S. publications
and writers." Pogrebin, Libel Gripes, supra note 5, at 1.
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I
American and English Libel Laws Compared
Almost every nation recognizes freedom of the press in either a
constitution23 or by custom. 24 Press freedom, however, is not abso-
lute: laws and judicial interpretations limit press freedom by balanc-
ing it against competing societal values. 2 An individual's reputation
is a societal value often in conflict with freedom of the press. Harm to
reputation (i.e., defamation) was "one of the earliest injuries recog-
nized by virtually every legal system."
26
The most critical question is how to accommodate both freedom
of the press and the law of defamation. As First Amendment scholar
Frederick Schauer noted: "[T]he. law of defamation in a society re-
flects, to a large extent, the assumptions of that society respecting the
relative importance of an untarnished reputation, on the one hand,
and an uninhibited press on the other."27 A comparative look at
American and English libel laws illuminates the differing assumptions
concerning the sociopolitical and legal boundaries of press freedom
vis-A-vis the individual's interest in her reputation.
Prior to the 1964 U.S. Supreme Court decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,28 which revolutionized American libel law,29
American libel law was, in essence, identical to the English common
law of libel.3" The Anglo-American law of defamation prior to Sulli-
23. For constitutional provisions on freedom of the press in various countries, see
CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H.
Flanz eds., 1993).
24. In Great Britain, there is no constitutional or statutory mechanism that explicitly
guarantees freedom of the press. It is indisputable, however, that the British press is as
free as most other press systems in the world. For a discussion of laws regulating British
press, see Michael Supperstone, Press Law in the United Kingdom, in PRESS LAW IN MOD-
ERN DEMOCRACIES 9 (Pnina Lahav ed., 1985).
25. PETER E. KANE, ERRORS, LIES, AND LIBEL at xiii (1991). For a thoughtful criti-
cism of "absolutism" on freedom of speech, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN
OPEN SOCIETY 23-27 (1992).
26. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESTATE 77
(5th ed. 1991).
27. Frederick Schauer, Social Foundations of the Law of Defamation: A Comparative
Analysis, 1 J. MEDIA L. & PRAC. 3 (May 1980).
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
29. Media attorneys Robert Sack and Sandra Baron termed the Sullivan ruling "revo-
lutionary." ROBERT D. SACK & SANDRA S. BARON, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED
PROBLEMS 7 (2d ed. 1994). See also Laura R. Handman & Robert D. Balin, The Interface
Between Foreign and Defamation Law: The First Amendment Goes Global, in LIBEL DE-
FENSE RESOURCE CENTER 50-STATE SURVEY 1992-93, at xxvii (Henry R. Kaufman ed.,
1993).
30. ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 156 (1991) [hereinafter MAKE No LAW]. Make No Law is a fascinating account of
1994]
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van followed a rule of strict liability,31 which was based on the ancient
doctrine that "[w]hatever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril."32
As stated in the original Restatement of Torts: "To create liabil-
ity for defamation there must be an unprivileged publication of false
and defamatory matter of another which (a) is actionable irrespective
of special harm, or (b) if not so actionable, is the legal cause of special
harm to the other."33 Thus, under the common law of libel, the plain-
tiff was entitled to damages for a false and defamatory statement pro-
vided it was published on an unprivileged occasion, regardless of the
defendant's level of culpability in the publication. In making a prima
facie libel case, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant communi-
cated a defamatory statement about the plaintiff.34 No actual injury
to reputation was required in establishing a cause of action, and the
.plaintiff merely had to plead falsity, not prove it.
35
However, the English common law and the pre-Sullivan United
States courts recognized three primary defenses for libel-truth, fair
comment and criticism, and the fair report privilege. Although truth
was accepted as a complete defense in civil actions, it was not recog-
nized in prosecutions for criminal libel.36 The oldest libel defense
37
grew out of principles of justice and public benefit. "To print or
broadcast the truth about persons is no more than they should expect.
In addition[,] the social good may be served by bringing to light the
truth about people whose work involves them in the public interest."38
Fair comment and criticism was another important libel defense
at common law. 39 In England, it remains "probably the most impor-
the Sullivan case with a penetrating analysis of the history and evolution of the First
Amendment.
31. Professor Herbert Wechsler, the attorney for the New York Times in Sullivan, ar-
gued that the strict liability rule evolved from the eighteenth-century effort of England "to
maintain royal immunity." LEWIS, MAKE No LAW, supra note 30, at 157.
32. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) (quoting Lord Mansfield in The King
v. Woodfall, Lofft, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (1774)).
33. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938).
34. Id. § 559.
35. Id.
36. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 840 (5th
ed. 1984). For a discussion of truth as a libel defense in the evolution of press freedom as a
libertarian concept in the United States, see Kyu Ho Youm, The Impact of People v. Cros-
well on Libel Law, JOURNALISM MONOGRAPHS No. 113 (June 1989).
37. WAYNE OVERBECK, MAJOR PRINCIPLES OF MEDIA LAW 102 (1993).
38. DWIGHT L. TEETER, JR. & DON R. LE Duc, LAW OF MASS COMMUNICATIONS 222
(7th ed. 1992).
39. Fair comment and criticism was first recognized as a libel defense in common law
in 1808. See DONALD M. GILLMOR ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 253 (5th ed. 1990)
(citing Carr v. Hood, 170 Eng. Rep. 983 (1808)).
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tant, and most commonly invoked defense" to libel actions.4" This
defense, known as the opinion defense, was modest in its original
boundaries. It was accepted only if the opinion was fair on the basis
of "true facts" that "fully and fairly justified" the opinion.41 Never-
theless, this doctrine was expanded over time to protect opinions con-
cerning matters of public concern based on true facts, whether or not
the opinion was "reasonable."42 The raison d'etre of the common law
defense was explained by an English court in 1808: "Liberty of criti-
cism must be allowed, or we should have neither purity of taste nor of
morals. Fair discussion is essentially necessary to the truth of history,
and the advancement of science."43
The fair report privilege is the third principal common law de-
fense.44 The privilege defense45 has its conceptual genesis in Curry v.
Walter, a 1796 British libel case.46 One American authority defined
the fair report privilege as follows: "The publication of defamatory
matter concerning another in a report of an official action or proceed-
ing or of a meeting open to the public that deals with a matter of
public concern is privileged if the report is accurate and complete or a
fair abridgement of the occurrence reported."47 The common law of
libel did not require fault or "malice," in the sense of spite or ill will
on the part of the defendant.
40. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON & ANDREW G.L. NICOL, MEDIA LAW 61 (2d ed. 1990).
41. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. a (1977).
42. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF DEFAMATION 6-6 (1994) (citation omitted). One
recent British report on libel and privacy notes: "[A] person may bring an action where he
can prove that words have been published, that they refer to him and that they are defama-
tory .... There is no remedy in defamation where the material published can be proved by
the defendant to be ... fair comment." Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, Re-
port of the Committee on Privacy and Related Matters, 25 (June 1990) (a report presented
to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department by Command of Her
Majesty) (on file with author).
43. Tabart v. Tipper, 170 Eng. Rep. 981 (1808).
44. In England, the fair report privilege is recognized as a "qualified privilege," rather
than an "absolute privilege." See PETER F. CARTER-RUCK ET AL., CARTER-RUCK ON LI-
BEL AND SLANDER 119-50 (4th ed. 1992).
45. Legal historian Frederick Siebert has characterized the fair report privilege as one
of "several important citadels" the English press wrestled from its government in its fight
for freedom between the 1750s and the 1850s. FREDERICK S. SIEBERT, THE RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES OF THE PRESS 190-91 (1934).
46. 126 Eng. Rep. 1046 (1796). The English court stated: "Though the matter con-
tained in the paper might be very injurious to the character of the magistrates, yet.., being
a true account of what took place in a court of justice which is open to all the world, the
publication of it was not unlawful." Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 611 (1977). For a comparative analysis of
the fair report privilege in American and English libel law, see Kyu Ho Youm, Fair Report
Privilege versus Foreign Government Statements: United States and English Judicial Inter-
pretations Compared, 40 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 124 (1991).
1994]
Since 1964, when the U.S. Supreme Court enunciated the "actual
malice" rule in Sullivan," American libel law has sharply diverged
from the protection of reputation found in British law toward the pro-
tection of the press. In England, libel is still a strict liability tort.
Under the strict liability rule, falsity is presumed, and the defendant
carries the burden of proving the truth of the purportedly libelous
statement. A prominent British media lawyer has argued:
The burden of proof on the media defendant in libel actions is a
good example of how English law makes no presumption in favor of
freedom of expression; on the contrary, it presumes that a tort has
been committed from the very fact that a criticism has been pub-
lished, and leaves the publishers to exculpate themselves as best
they can.49
In addition, under the common law rule, the defendant's fault need
not be established "unless the words complained of were published on
an occasion or under circumstances which would give rise to a defense
of privilege or fair comment."5 Moreover, the presumption of injury
to the plaintiff's reputation obviates the pleading or proof of compen-
satory damages by the plaintiff.5
In the United States, however, Sullivan and its progeny52 have
eliminated strict liability as a concept of American libel law. The U.S.
Supreme Court in Sullivan changed the burden of proof and intro-
duced an element of fault into American libel law. In announcing the
"actual malice" rule, the Supreme Court stated:
The constitutional guarantees require ... a federal rule that prohib-
its a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory false-
hood relating to his, official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with "actual malice"-that is, with knowledge
that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.
53
The "actual malice" standard, in sharp contrast with British libel law,
requires that the public official/public figure plaintiff54 first demon-
strate that the defendant published a falsity with a high degree of
48. For a discussion of the "actual malice" rule, see infra text accompanying note 53.
49. Geoffrey Robertson's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce a
Foreign Judgment at 4, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661
(1992) [hereinafter Robertson's Affidavit].
50. Calvey et al., supra note 8, at xix. See also Robertson's Affidavit, supra note 49, at
5.
51. Calvey et al., supra note 8, at xix.
52. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974). For a discussion of Gertz, see
infra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
53. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
54. In 1967, the Supreme Court extended .the "actual malice" rule to plaintiffs who
were public figures. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388
U.S. 130 (1967), decided as companion cases.
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fault. Consequently, since the plaintiff must show that there was
something false in the publication at issue, the burden of proof has
been shifted from the defendant to the plaintiff.
In connection with the shifted burden imposed by the Sullivan
court, the Supreme Court in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps55
held that the Constitution places the burden of proving falsity on a
plaintiff in a media libel case when the allegedly defamatory state-
ment relates to a matter of public concern. Whether the burden of
proof is placed on the plaintiff or the defendant will have a significant
impact on the outcome of the case. As a First Amendment commen-
tator noted: "In Britain, newspapers that go to court to defend
against a libel suit instead of settling lose almost every time, and a
major reason is that they have the burden of proving that the chal-
lenged story is true."56
Under American libel law, a remedy is easier to attain for a pri-
vate plaintiff than for a public plaintiff. As the Supreme Court in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.57 ruled, however, the plaintiff must prove
that the defendant at least was negligent in publishing a damaging
falsehood.5" The Gertz court rejected the strict liability rule as incom-
patible with the First Amendment principle in which "speech is always
more important" than reputation.59 In a libel action involving matters
of public concern, presumed and punitive damages are no longer per-
mitted unless the plaintiff meets the "actual malice" requirement.6"
Further, the plaintiff cannot claim damages without proving "actual
injury" to his reputation.61
The sweeping change in United States libel law epitomizes the
"starkest contrast" between the free speech laws of England and the
55. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
56. LEWIS, MAKE No LAW, supra note 30, at 157. See also Lewis, British Libel Law,
supra note 20.
57. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
58. Id. at 348.
59. Schauer, supra note 27, at 13.
60. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). Nevertheless, the Gertz rule
does not apply to libel cases involving private figures in matters of private interest. See
Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
61. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50. The U.S. Supreme Court explained:
[A]ctual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary
types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of rep-
utation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish
and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and
all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury,




United States.62 In the United States, "the press is considered to oc-
cupy a much more important role in the resolution of public issues,"
wrote Frederick Schauer, a noted legal scholar.6 3 "The press occupies
a special position in the American system, a position that accounts for
its strong protection against inhibiting defamation laws."
64
The Sullivan standard of "actual malice" is "anathema" to Eng-
land's legal tradition.65 The libel laws of England are more protective
of reputation than they are of the media's right to disseminate infor-
mation.66 This sensitivity to reputation is concisely expressed by lead-
ing British libel law authorities who reject Sullivan: "It is . . .
submitted that so wide an extension of the [Sullivan] privilege would
do more harm than good. It would tend to deter sensitive and honor-
able men from seeking public positions of trust and responsibility, and
leave them open to others who have no respect for their reputation. 67
II
American Media Sued in Foreign Courts
In discussing the growing need for an understanding of foreign
libel law, legal commentators have observed:
In cases where foreign plaintiffs complain of defamatory statements
by U.S. defendants, whether made here or abroad, foreign laws may
apply to determine liability. Foreign defamation law might be ap-
plied in a U.S. court via choice of law rules, or a plaintiff might seek
to enforce a foreign judgment by a subsequent action in the U.S. 68
62. Geoffrey Robertson, Two Cheers for the First Amendment, 9 COMM. LAW. 8
(1991). Two American legal commentators have argued:
In a very real sense, the [U.S.] Supreme Court's rejection of Britain's strict liabil-
ity standard and its requirement that a libel plaintiff demonstrate fault has
ushered in a second American Revolution. Just as the first American Revolution
created a "form of government ... 'altogether different' from the British form"
... so too the fault requirement and the actual malice standard have in the past
quarter century guaranteed American publishers a vital measure of constitutional
protection not available under British law.
Handman & Balin, supra note 29, at xxii.
63. Schauer, supra note 27, at 18.
64. Id.
65. Robertson, supra note 62, at 8. See also Robertson's Affidavit, supra note 49, at 8
(stating that the American libel law underlying the Sullivan case is "antipathetic to English
common law").
66. Robertson's Affidavit, supra note 49, at 9. See also HELSINKI WATCH, RE-
STRICTED SUBJECTS: FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 13-14 (1991).
67. Robertson's Affidavit, supra note 49, at 8-9 (quoting PHILIP LEWIS, GATLEY ON
LIBEL AND SLANDER 206 (J.E. Previte ed., 8th ed. 1981)).
68. Calvey et al., supra note 8, at xiv. For a discussion of the choice of law issues
involving international libel suits against American media, see DeRoburt v. Gannett Co.,
83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Haw. 1979); Kimberly Richards, Defamation Via Modern Communica-
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 16:235
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In Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.,6 9 the plaintiff
asked an American court to enforce a foreign libel verdict. Bachchan,
a case which more than a dozen major American media organizations
asserted would set a "dangerous precedent, 70 resulted from a British
High Court of Justice libel judgment against India Abroad Publica-
tions, Inc.71
The case against the New York-based publications company con-
cerned a story about the plaintiff that had appeared in two Indian
newspapers, copies of which were circulated in England. 72 The de-
fendant transmitted the story to an Indian news agency, pursuant to
an agreement between them, for distribution to Indian newspapers.73
The wire service story stated that Dagens Nyheter, a Swedish newspa-
per, had implicated Bachchan in a bribery scandal involving millions
of dollars paid by a Swedish arms company to obtain contracts with
the Indian government.74 The story also appeared in India Abroad,
the defendant's English-language weekly, which was reprinted and
distributed in England by defendant's English subsidiary, India
Abroad UK.75
In February 1990, Bachchan sued the Swedish newspaper in
London.76  At the same time, he initiated a separate libel action
tion: Can Countries Preserve Their Traditional Policies? 3 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 613, 633-58
(1990). For a discussion of DeRoburt, see infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
69. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992).
70. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 14, at 2. In Bachchan, fifteen American media
organizations submitted to the New York Supreme Court a friend-of-the-court brief in
support of India Abroad Publications. Among the media organizations were the New York
Times, Time Warner Publishing, Newsweek, CBS, NBC, Associated Press, Reader's Digest
Association, McGraw-Hill, Simon & Schuster, Random House, News America Publishing,
and Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group. In an editorial, it was argued: "[A]s a
legal precedent, the attempt by an Indian politician to have a New York state court enforce
a libel judgment by a British jury is disturbing and repugnant to U.S. and New York law."
Editorial, Libel Verdict, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Jan. 25, 1992, at 4.
71. Bachchan. 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
72. Id.
73. India Abroad Publications is a New York corporation that publishes India Abroad,
a weekly newspaper, and participates with the National Press Agency of India in operating
the India Abroad News Service as a two-way wire service between India and the United
States. Gopal Raju's Affidavit in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce a Foreign
Judgment at 1, 7, Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 [hereinafter Raju's Affidavit] (Gopal Raju is
the president of India Abroad Publications, Inc.).
74. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661. For a reprint of the story that was wired by the
defendant to the National Press Agency and published in India Abroad, see Memorandum
of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce a Foreign Judgment at 11, Bach-
chan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 [hereinafter Opposition Memorandum].
75. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661. Eight hundred of the 41,100 copies of the India
Abroad Feb. 9, 1990 issue, which carried the story on the plaintiff, were distributed in
England, Scotland and Wales by India Abroad UK. Raju's Affidavit, supra note 73, at 22.
76. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 12.
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
against India Abroad Publications for the wire service story.77  In
March 1991, Bachchan amended his libel claim to include an action
against India Abroad UK for its distribution of the India Abroad arti-
cle.78 India Abroad, however, argued unsuccessfully that India was
the proper forum for the libel suit.
79
Dagens Nyheter settled out of court for an undisclosed sum of
money and issued an apology.80 India Abroad reported the Swedish
newspaper's settlement and apologya' but "steadfastly" refused to
apologize or retract its story. 2 At the English jury trial, Justice Otton
of the High Court of Justice in London applied the strict liability stan-
dard of the English common law of libel.8 3 The jury awarded Bach-
chan £40,000 (then $70,000) in damages for the wire service story and
attorney's fees. 4
Since the judgment could not be enforced in England,85 the plain-
tiff asked the New York court to enforce the British libel ruling
against the defendant 6 under the New York Civil Practice Law and
77. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
78. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 13.
79. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Recognition and En-
forcement of a Foreign Judgment at 7, Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 [hereinafter Support
Memorandum].
80. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661-62. In the apology, the Swedish newspaper stated:
"[Tihey were misled earlier this year in trusting information from persons who were di-
rectly involved in the investigation into the Bofors transaction on behalf of the Indian
government." Support Memorandum, supra note 79, at 6-7.
81. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
82. Support Memorandum, supra note 79, at 7.
83. Laura R. Handman's Affirmation in Further Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to
Enforce a Foreign Judgment at 2-3, Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 [hereinafter Handman's
Affirmation]. For the text of the jury instructions given by Justice Otton in Bachchan, see
id. at Exhibits A and B.
84. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662. For the text of Justice Otton's judgment, see Affi-
davit in Opposition to Defendant's Application for Extension of Time to Answer or Move
at Exhibit A, Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661. The English court also granted the £40,000
judgment against India Abroad U.K. for its distribution of the English edition of the India
Abroad. Id.
85. See Support Memorandum, supra note 79, at 8-9. Bachchan's attorneys reportedly
said they could not enforce the judgment "because assets were unavailable in Britain."
Robin Pogrebin, A N.Y. Court Refuses to Enforce Decision in U.K. Libel Case, N.Y. OB-
SERVER, May 4, 1992, at 1 [hereinafter Pogrebin, N.Y Court Refuses]. See also Stephan
Skoufalos, Libel Suit Winner Is Not a Politician, EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Feb. 15, 1992, at 5
(letter to the editor from Bachchan's attorney, arguing that Bachchan sought to have his
English court judgment enforced in New York because of India Abroad's "conscious deci-
sion" to dishonor the judgment).
86. Skoufalos, supra note 85, at 5. Bachchan did not seek attorney's fees and costs
which, under British law, the defendant must pay. Opposition Memorandum, supra note
74, at 16.
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Rules (CPLR) which recognizes foreign country money judgments.87
India Abroad vigorously argued against enforcement of the British
judgment on the ground that the ruling was "fundamentally at odds
with the core constitutional protections '88 of the First Amendment8?
and the New York Constitution.90 Characterizing the judgment as
"plainly repugnant" to the public policy of New York, the defendant
maintained that under the CPLR the English judgment would fall
within an exception to the recognition of foreign judgments.91
Contending that the English judgment was repugnant to public
policy, India Abroad first challenged the restrictive strict liability stan-
dard applied by the British court.92 Second, India Abroad asserted
that under the "wire service" libel defense,93 no fault could be found
in the republication of a defamatory story that was originally, pub-
87. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662. The New York Civil Practice Law and Rules
stipulates:
Except as provided in section 5304 [on grounds for non-recognition], a foreign
country judgment meeting the requirements of section 5302 [on applicability] is
conclusive between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery of a
sum of money. Such a foreign judgment is enforceable by an action on the judg-
ment, a motion for summary judgment in lieu of complaint, or in a pending action
by counterclaim, cross-claim or affirmative defense.
N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. § 5303 (McKinney 1987). Section 5302 provides for applicability
of Article 53 on recognition of foreign country money judgments to "any foreign country
judgment which is final, conclusive and enforceable where rendered even though an appeal
therefrom is pending or it is subject to appeal." Id. § 5302. The New York State law is
based on the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act of 1962. See Handman
& Balin, supra note 29, at xxviii n.**. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recogni-
tion Act has been adopted by 22 states. See UNIFORM FOREIGN-JUDGMENTS RECOGNI-
TION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986 & Supp. 1993).
88. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 17.
89. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states in pertinent part: "Congress
shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
90. The New York Constitution states in pertinent part: "Every citizen may freely
speak, write and publish ... sentiments on all subjects." N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 8.
91. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 17-18. "A foreign country judgment
need not be recognized if... the cause of action on which the judgment is based is repug-
nant to the public policy of this state." N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. § 5304.
92. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 21-27.
93. The "wire service" libel defense, which was first recognized by the Florida
Supreme Court in 1933, states:
The mere reiteration in a daily newspaper, of an actually false, but apparently
authentic news dispatch, received by a newspaper publisher from a generally rec-
ognized reliable source of daily news, such as some reputable news service agency
engaged in collecting and reporting the news, cannot through publication alone
be deemed per se to amount to an actionable libel by indorsement, in the absence
of some showing from the nature of the article published, or otherwise, that the
publisher must have acted in a negligent, reckless, or careless manner in repro-
ducing it to another's injury.
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lished by a reputable news organization.94 Finally, India Abroad un-
derscored the freedom of the press values at stake, contending that
the British ruling dealt with "core political speech" about a prominent
public figure.95 India Abroad claimed that "[g]iven the preeminent
role that political speech plays in our democracy and the very deliber-
ate departure from British common law which the constitutional fault
requirement reflects, deference to our shared common law past with
Britain is clearly unwarranted in this case. "96
In his rebuttal, Bachchan argued that the public policy excep-
tion97 to the principle of "comity"98 did not apply to the British judg-
ment.99 He insisted that the cause of action on which the judgment
was based, rather than the judgment itself, must be repugnant to the
public policy of New York to render it unenforceable."° According to
Bachchan, there was no "repugnancy" in the cause of action underly-
ing plaintiff's judgment since "English law is the very model on which
the libel laws of New York and the United States were first
founded."10'
Bachchan also argued for a narrow construction of the public pol-
icy exception when the foreign jurisdiction shares common traditions
with the United States. 10 2 He pointed to a number of similarities be-
Layne v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 234, 238 (Fla. 1933). For a discussion of the wire service libel
defense, see Kyu Ho Youm, The 'Wire Service' Libel Defense, 70 JOURNALISm Q. 682
(1993).
94. Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 27-33.
95. Id. at 33-47. The defendant's view of Bachchan as a public figure under American
libel law was based on: (1) the fact that, for several years, he was the subject of interna-
tional news stories on the Bofors bribery scandal; (2) he was from a prominent family in
India and (3) he was a close friend of Rajiv Gandhi, the former Prime Minister of India.
Memorandum of Law in Further Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Enforce a Foreign
Judgment at 18, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 [hereinaf-
ter Further Opposition Memorandum].
96. Further Opposition Memorandum, supra note 95, at 17.
97. See supra note 91.
98. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated in a leading case on the recognition and en-
forcement of foreign judgments:
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recogni-
tion which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under the protection of its laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
99. Support Memorandum, supra note 79, at 15-30.
100. Id. at 15.
101. Id. (citation omitted).
102. Id. at 17.
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tween English and U.S. libel laws, including common causes of action,
common public policies, and common defenses.1"3
Judge Fingerhood of the New York court disagreed with Bach-
chan that the court can exercise its "discretion" in enforcing a foreign
libel judgment if the judgment disregards the constitutional standards
for a finding of libel.'" She stated that if the foreign judgment is re-
pugnant to policy embodied in both the federal and state constitu-
tions, "the refusal to recognize the judgment should be, and it is
deemed to be, 'constitutionally mandatory."" 5
Comparing English with American libel law, Judge Fingerhood
mentioned the strict liability rule still adhered to by British courts.1"6
She also noted that the burden of proof standards employed by the
English and U.S. courts were significantly different. 7
Judge Fingerhood declined to address the defendant's argument
that the law of England, as applied to Bachchan, failed to meet the
"actual malice" standard of Sullivan.1 °8 Instead, she considered
whether the libel law procedures of the English court in Bachchan are
comparable to those that, under American law, "are constitutionally
mandated for suits by private persons complaining of press publica-
"5109tions of public concern.
Applying the Gertz rejection of the strict liability standard and
the Hepps ruling on the burden of proof," 0 the New York court ex-
pressed strong reservations about the British law, which places the
burden of proving truth upon media defendants in libel litigation."'
The court observed: "The 'chilling' effect is no different where liabil-
ity results from enforcement in the United States of a foreign judg-
ment obtained where the burden of proving truth is upon media
defendants.""' 2 Thus, the court found Bachchan's judgment unen-
forceable in New York.
13
The New York court's refusal to recognize the British judgment
also was based on the difference between the liability standards of
English and New York law. Under English law, plaintiff Bachchan
103. Id. at 26.
104. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (1992).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 663.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. (emphasis added).
110. For a discussion of Gertz and Hepps, see supra notes 55, 57-61 and accompanying
text.





was not required to prove any degree of fault on the part of India
Abroad. Noting that, under New York libel law, a private plaintiff
must meet a "gross responsibility" standard in media libel actions for
publications of public concern,114 the court doubted whether Bach-
chan could have proved the defendant's actions in disseminating the
news story constituted gross negligence. The New York court ruled:
It is true that England and the United States share many common
law principles of law. Nevertheless, a significant difference between
the two jurisdictions lies in England's lack of an equivalent to the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The protection
to free speech and the press embodied in that amendment would be
seriously jeopardized by the entry of foreign libel judgments
granted pursuant to standards deemed appropriate in England but
considered antithetical to the protection afforded the press by the
U.S. Constitution.1
15
While Bachchan deals with international publications distributed
in several different national markets, the case is distinct from libel
cases in which "[a] person or corporation with global recognition and
reputational interests might claim that a publication which is widely
distributed defamed the prospective plaintiff in a number of jurisdic-
tions simultaneously and may institute multiple actions, including in
foreign jurisdictions.
'116
Sharon v. Time, Inc.," 7 a much-publicized "blood libel" case,'
18
involved a paragraph in an eight-page article published in the Febru-
ary 21, 1983 issue of Time magazine. 9 The article, entitled The Ver-
dict is Guilty, focused on the report of an Israeli commission
appointed to investigate the September 1982 massacre of Palestinians
114. Id. The New York Court of Appeals set forth the liability standard for private
figure libel actions in New York:
[W]here the content of the article is arguably within the sphere of legitimate pub-
lic concern, which is reasonably related to matters warranting public exposition,
the party defamed may recover; however, to warrant such recovery he must es-
tablish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the publisher acted in a grossly
irresponsible manner without due consideration for the standards of information
gathering and dissemination ordinarily followed by responsible parties.
Chapadeau v. Utica Observer-Dispatch, Inc., 38 N.Y.2d 196, 199 (1975).
115. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
116. Calvey et al., supra note 8, at xiv-xv.
117. 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
118. For a thoughtful discussion of Sharon v. Time, see RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING
THE PRESS 80-99 (1986). For a detailed "inside story" of Sharon from a pro-Sharon per-
spective, see URI DAN, BLOOD LIBEL (1987). "Blood libel" refers to the anti-Semitic slan-
der from the Middle Ages that "Jews were said to use the blood of murdered Christians to
make matzoh on Passover." RICHARD M. CLURMAN, BEYOND MALICE: THE MEDIA'S
YEARS OF RECKONING 86 (rev. ed. 1990).
119. Sharon, 599 F. Supp. at 542-43.
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by Lebanese Phalangist forces. 2 ° In his $50 million suit against Time,
Inc., Ariel Sharon, who served as the Israeli Defense Minister from
1981 to 1983, claimed that the story was defamatory because it de-
picted him as having "instigated, encouraged, or condoned" the
massacres.
121
In a New York federal district court, the jury returned a verdict in
favor of Time, Inc.122 Although the jury found Time, Inc. negligent in
publishing the defamatory story,1 23 Sharon, a public figure plaintiff,
failed to prove the requisite actual malice. 24
Sharon also had commenced an action in an Israeli court against
Time, Inc.1 25 The Israeli court stayed the action pending resolution of
the U.S. litigation. 126 Following the New York jury's finding that the
story was defamatory and false, the Israeli court held that the finding
was applicable to the Israeli libel suit.127 In January 1986, the Israeli
libel suit was settled. The settlement occurred "only after the Israeli
court indicated that it would be bound by the jury's findings regarding
falsity and defamation, but that it would not give res judicata effect to
the U.S. jury's verdict for Time on the actual malice, since there was
no similar requirement under Israel's law."' 28
Desai v. Hersh,'29 a similar libel case, was termed an "outlandish"
example of the excesses of litigation. 30 This 1989 libel suit was insti-
tuted by Morarji Desai, the Prime Minister of India from 1977 to 1979,
against author Seymour Hersh in an Illinois federal court. The $185
120. Id. at 542.
121. Id. at 543.
122. Id. at 538.
123. The foreman of the jury in the Sharon trial read the verdict: "We find that certain
Time employees, particularly correspondent David Halevy, acted negligently and carelessly
in reporting and verifying the information which ultimately found its way into the pub-
lished paragraph of interest in this case." DAN, supra note 118. at 249. Halevy was the
Time correspondent in Israel who wrote the libelous story.
124. Lois G. FORER, A CHILLING EFFECT 23 (1987).
125. Sharon brought a libel suit against Time in an Israeli court in February 1983. DAN,
supra note 118, at 36. Sharon's suit against Time, Inc. was filed in a New York court on
June 22, 1983. Id. at 47.
126. Id. at 43.
127. MICHAEL F. MAYER, THE LIBEL REVOLUTION 44-45 (1987).
128. Calvey et al., supra note 8, at xv. Res judicata is defined as a "[r]ule that a final
judgment rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits is conclusive as to
the rights of the parties and their privies, and, as to them, constitutes an absolute bar to a
subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 905 (6th ed. 1991).
129. 719 F. Supp. 670 (N.D. Ill. 1989), affd, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 190 (1992).
130. DONALD M. GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY, AND THE ABUSE OF LIBEL LAW 26-27
(1992) [hereinafter GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY].
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million action stemmed from statements in Hersh's book, The Price of
Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House.' In the book, distrib-
uted throughout the United States and overseas, Hersh reported that
while in office Desai sold Indian secrets to the Central Intelligence
Agency.
132
Desai, an internationally known politician, sought damages under
American law for defamatory injury incurred in the United States and
damages under Indian libel law, which is identical to English common
law, for injuries he suffered in India. 133 Hersh argued that since Desai
was a public figure and Indian law did not recognize the actual malice
rule, "to apply Indian defamation law would be contrary to the first
amendment."' 34 He also argued that the "single publication rule'
13
precluded application of the law of two countries in a single libel ac-
tion. 136 Desai responded that the First Amendment should not apply
to the for-profit publication in India of a book about an Indian. 37
With respect to the conditions under which the First Amendment
applies to extraterritorial publications, the Desai court stated:
[11n instances where the plaintiff is a public official or figure and
thus heightened first amendment protections, including the "actual
malice" standard, apply to domestic publication, these same protec-
tions will apply to extraterritorial publication of the same speech
where the speech is of a matter of public concern and the publisher
has not intentionally and directly published the speech in the for-
eign country in a manner consistent with the intention to abandon
first amendment protections.
138
131. Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 672.
132. Id.
133. Id. One commentator stated that Desai attempted to have India law applied in his
case "because Indian law and its British progenitor are not governed by U.S. constitutional
limitations." GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY supra, note 130, at 27.
134. Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 674.
135. Under the "single publication rule," as adopted by the Uniform Single Publication
Act:
No person shall have more than one cause of action for damages for libel or
slander or invasion of privacy or any other tort founded upon any single publica-
tion or exhibition or utterance, such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or
magazine or any one presentation to an audience or any one broadcast over radio
or television or any one exhibition of a motion picture. Recovery in any action
shall include all damages for any such tort suffered by the plaintiff in all
jurisdictions.
14 U.L.A. 377 (1990).
136. Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 674.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 680-81. In a supplemental opinion, the Desai court held:
[Fjirst amendment protections are only abandoned with respect to the law of the
nation in which there is intentional and direct publication in a manner consistent
with the intent to abandon those protections. If, for example, defendant had in-
tentionally and directly published the Book in Mexico, in a manner consistent
[Vol. 16:235
SUING AMERICAN MEDIA IN FOREIGN COURTS
It is noteworthy that Desai also filed suit in India.139 The court
stated that his purpose in filing the parallel action stemmed from the
fact that "the practicalities of obtaining recovery in one suit for defa-
mation occurring both without and within the United States, as well as
a more easily enforceable (and potentially larger) judgment, lead for-
eign plaintiffs to file suit in this country.'
140
Likewise, DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., Inc.,'141 a 1979 media libel
case, concerned questions of jurisdiction and liability in the context of
"cross-borders" defamation litigation. Donald Gillmor, a professor of
media law at the University of Minnesota, described DeRoburt as "the
paragon of sedition resurrected." '142 In DeRoburt, the President of Na-
uru, a Pacific island republic, sued the Gannett Company for a story
published in Pacific Daily News, its Guam subsidiary. 143 He claimed
that the story defamed him "both within Nauru and elsewhere in the
world."'144
DeRoburt, like the plaintiff in Desai,145 sought application of
both Nauru's libel law, which is similar to English law, and U.S. law.
146
The U.S. District Court in Hawaii decided the choice of law question
on the basis of the "relevant policies of this forum' 47 and the "justi-
fied expectations,' ' 48 and ruled that Nauru libel law applied, subject
to the First Amendment restrictions of Sullivan and its progeny. 14 9
with his intention to abandon first amendment protections, those protections
would be abandoned only with respect to a suit brought here under Mexican law.
However, defendant's first amendment protections would still apply to a suit
seeking to apply Indian law, where defendant's publication of the Book in India
was either unintentional, indirect or unsubstantial.
Id. at 681-82 (supplemental opinion). The federal district court's dismissal of Desai's libel
suit was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit, in 1992. See Desai v.
Hersh, 954 F.2d 1408 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 190 (1992).
139. Desai, 719 F. Supp. at 676.
140. Id.
141. 83 F.R.D. 574 (D. Haw. 1979).
142. GILLMOR, POWER, PUBLICITY, supra note 130, at 27.
143. DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 575.
144. Id. at 576. The Pacific Daily News article reported on the plaintiff's alleged im-
proper financial dealings in violation of both Nauru law and standards of international
diplomacy and relations. Id.
145. For a discussion of Desai, see supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
146. DeRoburt, 83 F.R.D. at 576, 580.
147. Id. at 580. The DeRoburt court noted that, except for the "actual malice" stan-
dard, "the policies underlying laws of defamation" in Nauru and the United States are not
in conflict. Id.
148. Id. The DeRoburt court agreed with the defendants that they published their
newspaper expecting that they would be guaranteed freedom of the press under the U.S.
Constitution. Id.
149. Id. DeRoburt's unsuccessful libel suit against the Gannett Company ended in
1988, after nine years of "storm[ing] the battlements of the First Amendment." GILLMOR,
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In 1984, Lynden O. Pindling, the Prime Minister of the Bahamas,
filed suit in Canada against the National Broadcasting Company
(NBC) for a broadcast that connected him to drug-related corrup-
tion."' ° Pindling v. National Broadcasting Company' 51 was brought
against NBC by the plaintiff after he won an undefended judgment in
a Bahamian court but was not awarded damages.' 52 Pindling claimed
that his reputation "was damaged when Canadian cable companies
broadcast NBC's program."' 53 In October 1989, Pindling dropped his
libel action against NBC after agreeing to a confidential settlement in




Cross-Border Suits: Bypassing American Libel Law?
As American attorney Neal Goldman said: "Winning a libel case
in London is a slam dunk."' 55 Geofrey Robertson, a British media
law specialist, explains that the restrictive British law of defamation
has made London "the libel capital of the world, as foreign public
figures queue" to claim damages for reputational injury that cannot be
won at home.' 56 Forum shopping,' 57 which Stephen Gillers, a law pro-
fessor at New York University, has characterized as "American as ap-
ple pie, '  is often cited as one of the principal reasons for suing
American media in England and other foreign countries.' 59 Commen-
POWER, PUBLICITY, supra note 130, at 27. See DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 859 F.2d 714 (9th
Cir. 1988).
150. See Pindling v. National Broadcasting Co., No. 17549/84, 1989 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 98,
*1 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (1989).
151. 49 O.R.2d 58 (1984).
152. Don J. DeBenedictis, Moving Abroad: Libel Plaintiffs Say It's Easier Suing U.S.
Media Elsewhere, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1989, at 38. NBC refused to appear in the Bahamian
court. Id.
153. Id.
154. Kathleen A. O'Connell, Libel Suits Against American Media in Foreign Courts, 9
DICK. J. INT'L L. 147, 161 (1991).
155. Pogrebin, Libel Gripes, supra note 5, at 1 (quoting attorney Neal M. Goldman).
156. Robertson, supra note 62, at 8.
157. Forum shopping "occurs when a party attempts to have his action tried in a partic-
ular court or jurisdiction where he feels he will receive the most favorable judgment or
verdict." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 128, at 452.
158. Pogrebin, Libel Gripes, supra note 5, at 1 (quoting Stephen Gillers, law professor
at New York University).
159. In his affidavit for India Abroad in Bachchan, Robertson said: "There has been an
upsurge in 'forum shopping' in recent years as recognition grows that London has the most
plaintiff-friendly courts, which will readily assume jurisdiction if there is evidence of small-
scale circulation." Robertson's Affidavit, supra note 49, at 10.
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tator Kimberly Richards has aptly placed the forum shopping issue in
perspective:
The increase in communication due to advanced technology has led
to more complex defamation litigation. For example, the plaintiffs
and defendants may be domiciled in more than one country or the
defamatory broadcast may be received in several countries. The
plaintiff in a defamation action may therefore have a group of coun-
tries from which to choose a forum.
160
The libel suit instituted in London by former Greek Prime Minis-
ter Andreas Papandreou against Time magazine serves as a good ex-
ample of forum shopping. 161 Papandreou sued in England, not in the
United States, because "the English law of libel is much more
favorable than the American law of libel. The prime minister, as a
public figure, would have had a much harder go at it" under American
law. 162 Interestingly, Papandreou chose not to sue Time, Inc. in
Greece, even though Greek libel law163 is far more favorable than
English libel law. According to his attorney, Papandreou wanted to
avoid any "political concerns" that might be raised by a libel suit in
Greece. 64 Indeed, Time, Inc. unsuccessfully argued that Greece, not
England, should be the proper forum for the libel suit.'
65
As a plaintiff-friendly forum in cross-border libel litigation, Can-
ada is similar to England. 166 Canada is "a good place" for English-
160. Richards, supra note 68, at 615.
161. The Time story, which led Papandreou to sue the news magazine, accused the
Greek Prime Minister of taking millions of dollars in embezzled funds. It was published in
the European edition of Time magazine on March 13, 1989. Pogrebin, Libel Gripes, supra
note 5, at 18.
162. DeBenedictis, supra note 152, at 38 (quoting Leonard B. Boudin, Papandreou's
attorney).
163. In Greece, libel is primarily recognized as a criminal offense under the Penal
Code, see CARTER-RUCK ET AL., supra note 44, at 337-39, though it is also accepted as a
tort, see THiMIos ZAHAROPOULOS & MANNY PARASCHOS, MASS MEDIA IN GREECE 88
(1993). See, e.g., Greece Sentences Cypriot Writer to 2 Years After Libel Conviction, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1983, at 6; 2 Greek News Executives Guilty of Libeling Writer, N.Y. TIMES,
March 27, 1984, at A10. One Greek-born American scholar has noted: "Libel is probably
the most popular case against the press, but rarely will a court decision reach the last
phases of litigation because most people settle out of court." Manny Paraschos, Legal
Constraints on the Press in Post-Junta Greece, 1974-77, 60 JOURNALISM Q. 48, 52 (1983).
See also ZAHAROPOULOS & PARASCHOS, supra (stating that about "90 percent of defama-
tion cases are settled out of court or automatically dismissed").
164. DeBendictis. supra note 152, at 38. The libel suit, which was filed on June 15, 1989,
is still pending before the High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, in London. As
of October 13, 1992, it was in the discovery process. Telephone Interview with Edward
Copeland, Papandreou's attorney (Oct. 13, 1992) [hereinafter Copeland Interview].
165. Copeland Interview, supra note 164.
166. Canadian libel law is comparable to English libel law. See Richards, supra note 68,
at 629. For a discussion of Canadian libel law, see generally ROBERT MARTIN & G. STU-
ART ADAM, A SOURCEBOOK OF CANADIAN MEDIA LAW 539-770 (1989).
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speaking plaintiffs, according to First Amendment lawyer Martin
Garbus. 67 The Pindling case 168 confirms the growing popularity of
Canada among international libel plaintiffs. In 1984, the Canadian
Court of Justice stated: "The real advantage to the plaintiff in bring-
ing the action in Ontario is that it is not necessary to establish 'actual
malice."",169 Furthermore, "there is no future for a public figure [in a
U.S. defamation action]!"' 7 °
From the perspective of the "law of satellite defamation,"'171 the
important question is whether these and other similar libel cases
against American media are being filed outside the United States only
to bypass the First Amendment. Kathleen O'Connell, a law review
commentator, has noted:
When . . . a plaintiff goes to a foreign court to sue an American
media defendant, he may or may not be motivated solely by the lure
of strategic advantages. The plaintiff may well be forum-shopping
for more positive law. However, the plaintiff may also be attempt-
ing to eliminate some of his defendant's more central defenses or
validly suing where his reputation may be said to have suffered the
most damage due to the international ties of media. 72
Bachchan is a good example 173 in this respect, since the libel action
was filed in London, the country where India Abroad "published"'
174
the defamatory article on Bachchan. Bachchan, a resident of London,
claimed that the article inflicted "personal and professional distress
and harm" upon himself and his family.175 Indeed, India Abroad
never asserted that New York was the appropriate forum or that
American libel law was applicable to the libel action. 76 Further, it
neither challenged the jurisdiction and procedure of the British
court,' 77 nor sought to "relitigate" the merits of Bachchan's defama-
tion claim. 78
.167. Pogrebin, Libel Gripes, supra note 5, at 1 (quoting attorney Martin Garbus).
168. For a discussion of Pindling, see supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
169. See Pindling v. National Broadcasting Corp., 49 O.R.2d 58, 65 (1984). For a discus-
sion of Ontario libel law, see CARTER-RUCK ET AL., supra note 44, at 297-300.
170. Dockser, supra note 13, at B5 (quoting F. Lee Bailey, Pindling's attorney).
171. John Cooper, Defamation by Satellite, 132 SOLICITORS J. 1021 (July 1988).
172. O'Connell, supra note 154, at 174 (emphasis added).
173. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992).
174. "Publication" is a term of art in the law of libel. As one American court defines it,
"[a] defamatory writing is not published if it is read by no one but the one defamed. Pub-
lished, it is, however, as soon as read by any one else." Ostrowe v. Lee, 175 N.E. 505 (N.Y.
1931).
175. Support Memorandum, supra note 79, at 3.
176. Id. at 7. India Abroad did request a forum change from England to India. See
supra note 79 and accompanying text.
177. Further Opposition Memorandum, supra note 95, at 2.
178. Id.
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Pindling may also have been motivated by more than the plain-
tiff's forum-shopping motivation. Pindling, for example, felt that his
reputation had been "significantly" harmed in Canada because close
ties existed between the Bahamas and Canada.' 79 Also, he estab-
lished the defamatory "publication" in his action because the chal-
lenged NBC program was broadcast by Canadian cable companies
without authorization. 8 ' The Canadian court exercised in personam
jurisdiction 8' over NBC and rejected NBC's assertion that the unau-
thorized broadcast by the Canadian cable companies was a justifiable
ground for dismissing the case. The court ruled that, regardless of
how the program originated, the alleged libel had occurred in
Canada.1
82
Papandreou chose London for his suit against Time magazine not
only for the benefit of British libel law, but for a variety of other rea-
sons, as well: the possible political consequences of a Greek suit, his
attorney was familiar with the British legal system and the "most dis-
turb[ing]" impact of the article resulted from the European edition of
Time.' 83 In addition, Papandreou was aware of the commonality be-
tween England and Greece as member nations of the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC). 84 Under the EEC's Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgments Act of 1982, "[i]n matters relating to tort a person domi-
ciled in a Contracting State may be sued in another Contracting State
in the courts for the place where the harmful act occurred.' 85 The
EEC act is especially noteworthy for its prohibition of multiple libel
179. Dockser, supra note 13, at B5 (quoting F. Lee Bailey, Pindling's attorney).
180. Id.
181. One libel authority explains as follows:
In personam jurisdiction (or "personal jurisdiction," or "jurisdiction over the per-
son") does not refer to the content or subject matter of the suit but rather to the
territorial limitations on the court's power to exercise jurisdiction over the person
of the defendant and issue a binding judgment against him.
SMOLLA, supra note 42, at 12-6 (citation omitted).
182. Pindling v. National Broadcasting Co., No. 17549/84, 1989 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 98, *1
(Ont. Sup. Ct. 1989) (relying for its reasoning on Jenner v. Sun Oil Co., O.R. 240, (1952), a
radio libel case). In Jenner, the Canadian High Court held that it does not matter if radio
broadcasts originate beyond the jurisdiction in a libel case against the owners of a radio
station, so long as there is shown to be a good arguable case that they were so transmitted
as to be published within the jurisdiction and cause the plaintiff to suffer substantially in
his reputation within the jurisdiction. Jenner, O.R. at 251. For a discussion of Jenner, see
Cooper, supra note 171, at 1021-22.
183. DeBenedictis, supra note 152, at 38. In 1991, the European edition of Time had a
paid circulation of 531,535. HACHTEN, supra note 3, at 99.
184. Copeland Interview, supra note 164.
185. CARTER-RUCK ET AL., supra note 44, at 248 (quoting article 5 of the Civil Jurisdic-
tion and Judgments Act of 1982). For a discussion of libel law in England relating to the
jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, as well as other related
issues, see id. at 240-60.
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suits in several EEC countries. That is, "[tlo avoid duplicity of actions
where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between
the same parties are brought in the courts of different contracting
states, the court which is first seised takes priority and the other must
decline jurisdiction of its own motion."
186
However, as Bachchan graphically illustrates, suing American
media in foreign courts is one thing, while enforcing foreign court
judgments is another.'87 This is especially true when, as in Bach-
chan,188 assets for the judgments are not available in the foreign coun-
tries. The only feasible alternative remaining for plaintiffs like
Bachchan is to ask American courts to recognize and enforce the for-
eign libel judgments against U.S. media defendants under the princi-
ple of "comity of nations.' 1 89 As set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1895, the comity principle states:
Where there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of
the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its own
country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show
either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it
was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect,
the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in this coun-
try upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an ap-
peal, upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was
erroneous in law or fact. 190
The application of this comity principle to Bachchan was rejected
by the New York court on the ground that it was "repugnant to public
policy."' 19 The New York court's refusal to enforce the British libel
judgment was heavily influenced by the First Amendment arguments
of the defendant and the media organizations who joined in the ami-
cus curiae brief opposing the judgment. 92 As the brief argued force-
fully, should Bachchan be enforced in New York, the message would
be unmistakable: "[S]ue in England (or elsewhere), avoid the consti-
186. Id. at 249. This statutory. approach is strikingly similar to the "single publication
rule" as recognized in American libel law. See supra note 135.
187. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
188. Id.
189. "Comity" is defined as courtesy, complaisance and respect. BLACK'S LAW DIc-
TIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979).
190. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202-03 (1895).
191. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 662 (1992). See
supra notes 104-05, 115 and accompanying text.
192. Compare Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 662-65. with Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note
14, at 5-12 and with Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 17-47.
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tutional requirement that you prove some degree of fault in order to
recover a judgment, recover that judgment on a strict liability theory,
and then return to the United States to enforce the judgment which
you could never have obtained here."' 93 The argument was made in
the context of Sullivan and its progeny, which have made the strict




In 1987, journalism scholars Todd Simon and Tlien-yu Lau ex-
pressed their skepticism about the likelihood of an international press
law which the United States would agree to apply to American media.
They argued that "any libel law that does not require proof of fault
and falsity is in direct conflict with the First Amendment. Under that
interpretation, the libel laws of almost the entire world are unconstitu-
tional in America."' 95 Their observation was remarkably perceptive.
Bachchan drew a parallel between the "chilling effect"' 9 6 of a
U.S. libel ruling on American media and that of a foreign judgment
entered without First Amendment safeguards, whose enforcement
hangs on U.S. courts. Given America's unique approach to libel law,
which the "actual malice" standard typifies more than any other,197 it
is of little surprise that the New York court in Bachchan dismissed the
British libel judgment as incompatible with the First Amendment
guarantees. 198
What are the ramifications of Bachchan for extraterritorial libel
suits against American media? The case is a clear warning against
rushing to foreign courts with libel complaints against American me-
dia "because if judgments can't be enforced here, it won't do any good
to go and get them there."'199 Floyd Abrams, a prominent First
193. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 14, at 9.
194. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
195. Todd F. Simon & Tuen-yu Lau, When Systems Collide: Trial of Foreign Commu-
nist Media in U.S. Courts 15 (Aug. 1987) (research paper presented at the annual conven-
tion of the Association for Education in Journalism and Mass Communication in San
Antonio, Tex.) (on file with author).
196. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1992).
197. Professor Alan Dershowitz of Harvard Law School states: "The United States is
the only country in the world whose law requires 'actual malice' before a public person can
win a libel suit." ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, TAKING LIBERTIES 62 (1988). See also Simon &
Lau, supra note 195, at 7 ("No other country routinely applies anything like the American
'actual malice' standard.").
198. Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
199. Pogrebin, N.Y. Court Refuses, supra note 85, at 19 (quoting Harriette Dorsen,
General Counsel, Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.).
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Amendment attorney, said that "[i]t is an important ruling and it es-
tablishes an important precedent which, if affirmed, should help to
dissuade individuals and companies from seeking to avoid the protec-
tions of the First Amendment."20 Professor Ronald Dworkin of New
York University agreed that the decision will "substantially" increase
the freedom of American publications abroad.20 '
Notwithstanding these and other similar comments,20 2 the Bach-
chan ruling does not afford American media with a circulation abroad
a carte blanche right to defame. Should a plaintiff seek the assistance
of U.S. courts before, during or after libel proceedings, the defendant-
oriented American libel standards will be required; otherwise the
Bachchan case is of limited value. For instance, if an American or a
foreign national sues a major transnational American media organiza-
tion in a foreign court for.a defamatory publication in a foreign coun-
try where the media company maintains substantial assets, 20 3 the
plaintiff would not have to request an American court to enforce the
libel judgment. In such circumstances, Bachchan would not impact a
foreign libel judgment against an American media defendant.20 4 In-
deed, Laura Handman and Robert Balin, the defense attorneys in
Bachchan, recently noted: "As a practical matter, the opportunity to
oppose foreign libel judgments in U.S. courts will rarely (if ever) be
available to the largest American news organizations which presuma-
200. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Floyd Abrams). Contrary to some predictions, see,
e.g., Andy McCord, Offshore Libel; N.Y. Supreme Court Throws Out Lawsuit Against
Newspaper 'India Abroad,' Editorial, THE NATION, May 25, 1992, at 688, the plaintiff in
Bachchan did not appeal the New York court's ruling. Telephone Interviews with Stephan
Skoufalos, Bachchan's attorney, and Robert Balin, India Abroad's attorney (Oct. 8, 1992).
201. Ronald Dworkin, The Coming Battles Over Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July
11, 1992, at 55 n.2.
202. See, e.g., Libel Laws; Curbing Court Shopping, ECONOMIST, Apr. 25, 1992, at 103;
McCord, supra note 200, at 689; Pollock & Anders, supra note 15, at B6; Adam Sage,
American Court Rejects English Libel Award, INDEPENDENT (London), Apr. 17, 1992, at 3.
203. In an extreme case in 1978, the New York Times and the Baltimore Sun paid the
court costs and fines imposed on their Moscow correspondents by a court in the former
Soviet Union for publication of "slanderous" information about the Soviet State Televi-
sion. Russia Convicts Two Newsmen of State Slander, NEWS & L., Oct. 1978, at 42. They
"feared that personal property [of their Moscow correspondents] might be seized" had
they not paid. Id. For an international and comparative law analysis of this case, see Rona
Warren, Note, The Free Press and Its Territorial Limitations: United States Correspondents
in the Soviet Courts, 5 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 349 (1979).
204. See Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also supra notes
117-28 and accompanying text. The Israeli "judge awarded Sharon $2,000 in legal fees,"
and eventually, "both parties settled the suit for an undisclosed amount." O'Connell,
supra note 154, at 168 (citations omitted). For a discussion of Pindling, see supra notes
150-54 and accompanying text.
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bly have significant assets dedicated abroad (and are therefore subject
to foreign enforcement proceedings).
20 5
Moreover, Bachchan's precedential value is limited, since it is
merely the ruling of a New York State trial court and involved an
unusual array of compelling facts. Bachchan involved "public con-
cern" speech20 6 which dealt with matters of international interest, and
the republication of the story was based on the defendant's "good
faith" reporting. 2 7 If these elements had been absent from the case,
the Bachchan court might have ruled differently. Thus, it should not
be hastily concluded that Bachchan has eliminated the possibility that
a foreign libel judgment will be enforced in the United States.20 8
Some media lawyers expect Bachchan to put pressure on England
and other countries to adopt the standards of American libel law.20 9
Geoffrey Robertson, a media lawyer, hopes that the acceptance of
Bachchan will liberalize English libel law and the laws of British Com-
monwealth countries which still continue with their English legal in-
heritance.210 It might, however, be too early to envision the "very
conservative" English bar embracing the Bachchan ruling.211 Rather,
the New York court decision is more likely to be perceived by some as
an "American-centric" example of "trumping ... the British ruling
with an our-laws-are-better-than-your-laws stance, ' 212  especially
since it is exceedingly unusual for American courts to refuse to en-
force ordinary civil judgments from foreign courts.213
Justice Fingerhood's opinion in Bachchan offers little evidence
that the New York court pondered the possibility of a charge that its
205. Handman & Balin, supra note 29, at xvix n.*.
206. Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 (1992) (citing
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1985)).
207. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
208. India Abroad has argued in a hypothetical case:
If this case involved something less than core political speech commenting on the
actions of the government or if the plaintiff was not a prominent public figure in
the inner circle of the highest official of the land or if the judgment was based on,
at the very least, some minimal requirement of fault or if the application of a fault
standard did not so clearly and decisively place the publication within the orbit of
constitutional protection, then deference to a foreign judgment based on English
law might present a closer question.
Opposition Memorandum, supra note 74, at 33-34.
209. See Pogrebin, N.Y. Court Refuses, supra note 85, at 19.
210. Robertson's Affidavit, supra note 49, at 19.
211. Pogrebin, Libel Gripes, supra note 5, at 18 (quoting Harold Evans, a former British
newspaper editor).
212. Pogrebin, N.Y. Court Refuses, supra note 85, at 19.
213. Pollock & Anders, supra note 15, at B6 (quoting Andreas Lowenfeld, a professor




ruling would be tantamount to an imposition of American law upon
other countries. To ward off criticism of the opinion, the Bachchan
court might have cited Lingens v. Austria,214 a 1986 European Court
of Human Rights decision, as persuasive authority in addition to
American case law. In Lingens, the European Court of Human
Rights215 held, echoing the U.S. Supreme Court in Sullivan and its
progeny,21 6 that the media defendant is not required to prove truth
because such a burden of proof would violate the free speech right in
a democratic society.217 Accordingly, the European Court stated that
the public figure plaintiff has the burden of proving the falsity of the
defamatory statement.218 The European Court's application of a rule
similar to the Sullivan "actual malice" standard provides a strong in-
ternational affirmation of the United States as "one of the great free
speech 'laboratories of experiment.' ' 219  Had the Bachchan court
cited Lingens as international authority, Bachchan might have seen
greater acceptance in foreign countries and received less cynical tones
of American-centricism. It should be emphasized, however, that
Lingens may still be distinguished from Bachchan in one significant
aspect. Lingens considered the public figure status of the plaintiff in
shifting the burden of proof, while Bachchan avoided determining the
status of the plaintiff by focusing on the public nature of the story in
question.22°
No court decision, including Bachchan, has yet examined the is-
sue of whether a plaintiff can claim all the damages for harm to repu-
tation allegedly resulting from publication of defamation throughout
the world. In view of the relatively small amount of damages awarded
to Bachchan, it is clear the English jury did not assess the harm in-
curred in the United States and India. Similarly, Sharon and Desai
paid little attention to the aggregate injury suffered by the plaintiffs in
various countries in which the alleged defamation was published. The
choice of law questions regarding damages will be further elucidated
as appellate case law evolves in the future.
214. 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. 11 (Ser. A) (1986).
215. The European Court of Human Rights is a mechanism for securing the rights and
freedoms of the citizens of the member nations of the European Convention on Human
Rights. England is one of the nine signatories to the Convention of 1953. For the text of
the European Convention on Human Rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS READER 205-11 (Walter
Laqueur & Barry Rubin eds., rev. ed. 1989).
216. See supra notes 52-61 and accompanying text.
217. Lingens, 103 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 24-26.
218. Id.
219. SMOLLA, supra note 25, at 351 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Fiebmann, 285 U.S.
262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
220. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09, 114, 206.
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V
Summary and Conclusions
The increasing libel litigation against American media in foreign
countries highlights the emerging legal modus operandi of the global-
izing American media. Without question, transnational U.S. media
companies must be concerned not only with the law of defamation in
foreign countries, but also with the rights afforded them when they
are sued for libel in foreign courts.
Libel laws vary from country to country. A comparison between
American and English libel laws indicates how each country ap-
proaches the balancing of reputation and freedom of expression with
different sociopolitical assumptions. While U.S. law accords press
freedom a "preferred position" by way of the "actual malice" defense,
English libel law recognizes no preferential status of speech and press
rights vis-+'a-vis reputation.22' Several libel suits have been instituted
against American media in foreign courts in recent years.222 Some
clearly were for the "forum-shopping" advantages. However, con-
cerns about damage to reputation may also explain the plaintiff's
choice of forum.
Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., the most important
cross-borders libel case to date, is very significant for American me-
dia. The decision of a New York trial court has established a legal
precedent that foreign libel judgments will not be recognized and en-
forced by American courts if they contravene First Amendment guar-
antees. It sends a signal to actual and potential plaintiffs in
extraterritorial litigation against American media: If you want to use
the American judicial process, be prepared to meet the requirements
of the First Amendment.
It must be kept in mind, however, that Bachchan does not apply
to American media in every libel suit in foreign courts. It is of little
help, for example, to American media libel defendants in a foreign
country when the foreign court judgment can be enforced within that
country.223
221. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 10-14.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 203-05.
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All in all, the implications of Bachchan and similar libel cases will
be far-reaching from an "international" libel law perspective. Indeed,
Bachchan may serve as the catalyst for adoption of a universal law of
defamation. z24
224. Right of reply, which is currently recognized in a number of countries as a statu-
tory concept, might be a useful point of discussion as a step to exploring an international
libel law. A right of reply provides an opportunity for a person who is attacked to respond
in her own words. The international acceptance of the right of reply is significant. See
American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, art. 14 ("Anyone injured by inaccurate
or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated
medium of communications has the right of reply or make a correction using the same
communications outlet, under such conditions as the law may establish."). For the text of
the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, see HUMAN RIGHTS READER, supra
note 215, at 238.
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